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Abstract
Machine learning algorithms, however effective,
are known to be vulnerable in adversarial scenar-
ios where a malicious user may inject manipu-
lated instances. In this work we focus on evasion
attacks, where a model is trained in a safe envi-
ronment and exposed to attacks at test time. The
attacker aims at finding a minimal perturbation of
a test instance that changes the model outcome.
We propose a model-agnostic strategy that builds
a robust ensemble by training its basic models
on feature-based partitions of the given dataset.
Our algorithm guarantees that the majority of the
models in the ensemble cannot be affected by the
attacker. We experimented the proposed strategy
on decision tree ensembles, and we also propose
an approximate certification method for tree en-
sembles that efficiently assess the minimal accu-
racy of a forest on a given dataset avoiding the
costly computation of evasion attacks.
Experimental evaluation on publicly available
datasets shows that proposed strategy outperforms
state-of-the-art adversarial learning algorithms
against evasion attacks.
1. Introduction
Machine Learning (ML) algorithms are currently used to
train models that are then deployed to ensure system security
and to control critical processes (Huang et al., 2011; Biggio
& Roli, 2018). Unfortunately, traditional ML algorithms
proved vulnerable to a wide range of attacks, and in par-
ticular to evasion attacks, where an attacker carefully craft
perturbations of an inputs to force prediction errors (Biggio
et al., 2013; Nguyen et al., 2015; Papernot et al., 2016a;
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016).
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While there is a large body of research on evasion attacks
in linear classifiers (Lowd & Meek, 2005; Biggio et al.,
2011) and, more recently, on deep neural networks (Szegedy
et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015), there are a few works
dealing with tree-based models. Decision trees are inter-
pretable models (Tolomei et al., 2017), yielding predic-
tions which are human-understandable in terms of syntactic
checks over domain features, which is particularly appealing
in the security setting. Moreover, decision trees ensembles
are nowadays one of the best methods for dealing with non-
perceptual problems, and are one of the most commonly
used techniques in Kaggle competitions (Chollet, 2017).
In this paper we present an algorithm, called Feature Par-
titioned Forest (FPF), that builds an ensemble of decision
trees aimed to be robust against evasion attacks. Indeed, the
trained ensemble is a binary classifier that we show to be,
in most of the cases, robust by construction. In fact, given a
test instance that the attacker aims to corrupt, if most of the
trees in the ensemble returns accurate binary predictions for
that instance, the attacker has no chance to attack the whole
ensemble. Our method is based on a particular sampling of
the features, where we randomly equi-partition the set of
features, and train each tree on a distinct feature partition.
Moreover, as usual in the context of adversarial learning, we
count on a threat model that limits the budget of an attacker,
that can only manipulate a limited number of features, thus
upper bounding the distance between the original instance
and the perturbed one. We also propose an approximate
certification method for our tree ensembles that efficiently
assesses the minimal accuracy of a forest on a given dataset,
avoiding the costly computation of evasion attacks.
2. Related Work
Most of the work in this adversarial learning regards clas-
sifiers, in particular binary ones. The attacker starts from a
positive instance that is classified correctly by the deployed
ML model and is interested in introducing minimal per-
turbations on the instance to modify the prediction from
positive to negative, thus “evading” the classifier (Nelson
et al., 2010; Biggio et al., 2013; 2014; Srndic & Laskov,
2014; Kantchelian et al., 2016b; Carlini & Wagner, 2017;
Dang et al., 2017; Goodfellow et al., 2015). To prevent
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these attacks, different techniques have been proposed for
different models, including support vector machines (Biggio
et al., 2011; Xiao et al., 2015), deep neural networks (Gu
& Rigazio, 2015; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Papernot et al.,
2016b), and decision tree ensembles (Kantchelian et al.,
2016b; Chen et al., 2019a). Unfortunately, the state of the
art for decision tree ensembles is far from satisfactory.
The first adversarial learning technique for decision tree en-
sembles is due to Kantchelian et al. and is called adversarial
boosting (Kantchelian et al., 2016b). It is an empirical data
augmentation technique, borrowing from the adversarial
training approach (Szegedy et al., 2014). Another adver-
sarial learning technique for decision tree ensembles was
proposed in a recent work by Chen et al., who introduced
the first tree learning algorithm embedding the attacker di-
rectly in the optimization problem solved upon tree construc-
tion (Chen et al., 2019a). The key idea of their approach,
called robust trees, is to redefine the splitting strategy of the
training examples at a tree node. Finally, our algorithm FPF
has some relations with Random Subspace method (RSM)
(Ho, 1998), which was successfully exploited by Biggio
et al., 2010 to build ensembles where each single model is
trained on a projection of the original dataset on a subset of
its features.
3. Robust Forest Training
We aim to design a machine learning algorithm able to
train forests of binary decision trees that are resilient to
evasion attacks, which occurs when an adversary adaptively
manipulates test data to force prediction errors. Specifically,
in this section we discuss our algorithm able to train a robust
forest that is resilient in a strong adversarial environment,
where attackers can perturb at most b features of a test
instance to deceive the learnt model and force a prediction
error. We first introduce some notation and the threat model,
then we discuss our algorithm.
3.1. Background and Notation
Let X ⊆ Rd be a d-dimensional vector space of real-valued
features. An instance x ∈ X is a d-dimensional feature
vector (x1, x2, . . . , xd), where we denote with F the set of
features. Each instance x ∈ X is assigned a label y ∈ Y
by some unknown target function g : X 7→ Y . The goal
of a supervised learning algorithm that induces a forest of
decision trees is to find the forest T that best approximates
the target g.
In this paper we discuss binary classification, where Y =
{−1,+1}, and focus on binary decision trees. Each tree
t ∈ T can be inductively defined as follows: t is either
a leaf λ(yˆ) for some label yˆ ∈ Y , or a internal test node
σ(f, v, tl, tr), where f ∈ [1, d] identifies a feature, v ∈ R
is the threshold for the feature f , and tl, tr are left/right
decision trees.
At test time, an instance x traverses each tree t ∈ T until
it reaches a leaf λ(yˆ), which returns the prediction yˆ, de-
noted by t(x) = yˆ. Specifically, for each internal test node
σ(f, v, tl, tr), x falls into the left tree tl if xf ≤ v, and into
the right tree tr otherwise. Given a forest T , the global
prediction is defined as T (x) = +1 if∑t∈T t(x) > 0, and
T (x) = −1 otherwise.
Finally, given a test set Dtest, let E = {(x, y) ∈ Dtest | y ·
T (x) < 0} be the set of test instances that are not classified
correctly by T . We can finally define the accuracy as:
Acc =
|Dtest| − |E|
|Dtest|
3.2. Threat Model
We focus on the evasion attack scenario, where an attacker
aims at fooling an already trained classifier by maliciously
modifying a given instance before submitting it to the clas-
sification model. The perturbation caused by the attacker is
not unconstrained as the attack should be “invisible” to the
classification system.
As in Kantchelian et al. (Kantchelian et al., 2016a), we
assume an attacker Ab that is capable of modifying a given
instance x into a perturbed instance x′ such that the L0-
norm of the perturbation is smaller than the attacker’s budget
b, i.e., ‖x− x′‖0 ≤ b. Therefore, attacker Ab can perturb
the instance x by modifying at most b features, without
any constraint on how much a given feature can be altered.
Indeed, a very small b is sufficient to achieve successful
attacks. Su et al. (Su et al., 2019) show that with a one-pixel
attack, i.e., with b = 1, it is possible to fool a complex deep
neural network as VGG16 (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014)
and decrease its accuracy to a poor 16%.
Given an instance x ∈ X , we denote by Ab(x) the set of all
the perturbed instances the attacker may generate:
Ab(x) = {x′ | x′ ∈ X ∧ ‖x− x′‖0 ≤ b} .
Finally, we can define the accuracy under attack that an
attacker Ab aims to minimize. Given the test set Dtest,
let E = {(x, y) ∈ Dtest | y · T (x) < 0}. We define
E′ = {(x, y) ∈ Dtest \ E | ∃x′ ∈ Ab(x), y · T (x′) < 0}
be the set of the perturbed instances that are not classified
correctly by T . We can finally define the accuracy under
attack as:
AccAb =
|Dtest| − |E ∪ E′|
|Dtest| (1)
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3.3. Our algorithm
In the following we propose a novel training strategy that
produces a forest T where the majority of its trees are not
affected by the attacker Ab.
Feature Partitioning. Given a set partition P of the fea-
ture set F and an attacker Ab that decided to corrupt the set
of features B ⊆ F , with |B| ≤ b, we can easily compute
the number of sets in P overlapping with B as:1
O(P, B) =
∑
P∈P
1[B ∩ P 6= ∅].
We call P robust if the majority of its sets cannot be im-
pacted by the attacker Ab, i.e., if the following property
holds:
∀B ⊆ F , |B| ≤ b O(P, B) < |P|
2
.
When |B| ≤ b, it is straightforward to show that this prop-
erty is surely satisfied if |P| ≥ 2b+ 1. Consider the worst
case: at most b distinct subsets of P can have an overlap
with B, leaving other ≥ b+1 subset of P unaffected. Here-
inafter, we consider only robust feature partitions P where
|P| = 2b+ 1.
Robust forest. Let’s consider a forest T that, given an
attacker Ab, is built by exploiting a robust feature partition
P as follows.
Let D be a set of training instances x ∈ X , and P be a
robust partition of its feature space F . Given P ∈ P , we
call piP (D) the projection of D on the feature set P , i.e.,
the dataset obtained from D by discarding those features
not included in P . Given a robust feature partitioning P , it
is thus possible to build a robust forest by training 2b + 1
trees independently on the 2b+ 1 projections piP (D), with
P ∈ P .
The algorithm sketched above achieves what we formally
define as robustness.
Definition 1 (Robust Forest) Given an attacker Ab, we
say that a forest T is robust if the majority of its trees is not
affected by Ab for any of its attacks:
∀x ∈ X ,∀x′ ∈ Ab(x)
∑
t∈T
(1[t(x) = t(x′)]) >
|T |
2
It is straightforward to show that if a forest is built on the
basis of a robust feature partitioning P as described above,
then, at most b of its 2b + 1 trees can be affected by the
attacker.
1
1[e] equals 1 if expression e is true and 0 otherwise.
Algorithm 1 FPF
Input: dataset D, attacker Ab, training rounds r
T ← ∅
k ← 2 ∗ b+ 1
for i = 1 to r do
repeat
Ti ← ∅
Pi ← RandomPartition(F , k)
for all Pj ∈ Pi, j = 1, . . . , k do
t← DecisionTree(piPj (D))
Ti ← Ti ∪ {t}
end for
until AcceptCondition(Ti)
T ← T ∪ Ti
end for
return T .
In the best case scenario where each t ∈ T is perfectly
accurate, the above robustness property provides that, in
presence of attacks, only a minority of trees provides an
incorrect prediction. Clearly, this scenario is unlikely, and
therefore we discuss below how to strengthen the accuracy
of T .
Note that, the above definition and training strategy trivially
generalizes to any ensemble learning algorithm.
Increasing the accuracy of a robust forest. The above
definition does not provide any guarantee on the accuracy
of the full forest T , which clearly depends on the accuracy
of its single trees. Yet, the more accurate the trees t ∈ T ,
the more likely the forest T is accurate under attack.
The accuracy of single trees depends on the feature partition-
ing P . The larger |P| the smaller is the number of features
each tree can be trained on. To increase the accuracy of
a robust forest T , we equi-partition F across P so as to
have |P | ≥ b |F|2b+1c for all P ∈ P . Clearly, as the attacker’s
power b increases, we require to partition F in to a larger
number of subsets, and for these to be effective we need
the dataset to have a larger number of high quality features.
Note that this is true for every learning algorithm: if the
attacker can perturb at will up to b features, it is necessary
to have more than b high quality features to train an accurate
model.
In addition, a specific partitioning P may only be sub-
optimal as there may be multiple way of partitioning F
so as to achieve features subsets with high predictive power.
Along the lines of ensemble training, we use multiple feature
partitionings and join together the resulting robust forests in
a single decision tree ensemble.
Finally, we can sketch our algorithm FPF to train a forest T
aimed to be robust against an attacker Ab that can perturb
Feature Partitioning for Robust Tree Ensembles and their Certification in Adversarial Scenarios
at most b features. The algorithm, shown in Alg. 1, iterates
a number r of user-defined rounds. During each round i,
the algorithm generates a random feature partitioning Pi of
the features F present in the given training dataset D. The
feature set F is randomly and evenly split into k = 2b+ 1
disjoint subsets, and a new decision tree is trained on each
of the dataset projections piP (D) for every feature subset
P ∈ Pi. The resulting 2b + i trees form a tree ensemble
Ti. We use an accept condition to filter out those Ti that
would not strengthen the final forest. For instance, it might
be the case that the some partitions in Pi do not contain
sufficiently predictive features to train accurate trees. In
this work, we use a simple acceptance criteria according to
which a Ti is accepted if its accuracy is larger than naı¨vly
predicting the dataset’s majority class. In this case, the trees
of Ti are added to the forest T . Eventually the returned
forest contains a total of r(2b+ 1) trees.
Proposition 1 (Robustness of FPF) The forest T built by
the algorithm FPF is robust against and attacker Ab as the
majority of its tree is not affected byAb for any of its attacks.
At each round FPF trains a set of 2b + 1 trees, which, as
discussed above, is robust because at most b of its trees can
be affected by Ab. After the same reasoning applied to r
rounds, FPF builds a forest T of r(2b+1) trees of which at
most rb can be affected byAb, leaving a majority of r(b+1)
trees unaltered.
4. Evaluation and certification of tree-based
models
Evaluating the accuracy of a model in presence of an at-
tacker is a difficult and computationally expensive task.
This is due to the possibly large size of Ab(x) for some
x ∈ X and to the number of interactions among trees in
a forest. Chen et al., 2019b show that verifying the ro-
bustness of a forest T with at most l leaves per tree has
cost min{O(l|T |), O((2|T |l)|F|)} assuming a L∞-norm at-
tacker. Kantchelian et al., 2016a prove that in case of a
L0-norm attacker, as in this work, the problem of finding a
successful attack is NP-complete.
Below we first provide an expensive brute-force strategy
for evaluating the accuracy under L0-norm attack, then we
show that the evaluation problem can be reduced to a maxi-
mum coverage problem and we propose a few very efficient
heuristic strategies that can be used both to reduce the cost
of the brute-force strategy and to provide a lower-bound
certification for a tree-ensemble model on a given dataset.
4.1. Brute-force evaluation
Given an instance x ∈ X , the brute-force evaluation of a
forest T consists in generating all the possible perturbations
an attacker Ab is capable of to find whether there exists
x′ ∈ Ab(x) such that T (x) 6= T (x′).
The size of Ab(x) is infinite, but we can limit its enumera-
tion to the set of attacks that are relevant for the given forest
T , i.e., those attacks that can invert the outcome of a test
in some internal nodes of trees in T . Recall that nodes in a
tree are in the form xf ≤ v for some threshold v. Indeed,
the thresholds used in the tree nodes induce a discretization
of the input space X that we exploit as follows.
For any given feature f ∈ F , we define with Vf the set of
relevant thresholds as follows:
Vf = {v | ∃σ(f, v, tl, tr) ∈ t, t ∈ T } ∪ {∞}
The set Vf includes all the thresholds that are associated to
f in any node σ(f, v, tl, tr) of any tree in T , plus the ∞
value that allows to traverse the right branch of the node
with the largest threshold.
Given an attackerAb, the set of relevant perturbations is thus
given by the cartesian product of sets Vf for b different fea-
tures. Let Fb be the set of all subsets F ⊆ F having size at
most b, we denote with Aˆb(x) the set of such perturbations,
formally defined as:
Aˆb(x) = {x′ | xf = v,∀v ∈ Vf ,∀f ∈ F, F ∈ Fb}
We conclude that an attacker Ab can successfully perturb
an instance x against a forest T if there exists at least one
x′ ∈ Aˆb(x) for which T (x) 6= T (x′).
This brute-force approach is very expensive, due to three
factors: i) as b increases, the number of feature combinations
Fb increases; ii) as the number of trees and nodes grows,
the number of threshold values associated with each feature
increases; iii) for each perturbed instance x′, the prediction
T (x′) must be retrieved by traversing the given forest.
4.2. Attacking forest T as a Maximum Coverage
Problem.
Given a forest T and an input instance x the attacker Ab
aims at finding those perturbations that lead the majority of
the trees to a wrong prediction. Indeed, as some trees of T
might give incorrect predictions before the attack, it could
be sufficient to harm less than dT /2e trees.
We now introduce some simplifying assumptions and then
show that finding an attack can be reduced the the maxi-
mum coverage problem. First, we assume that if a tree in
T provides a wrong prediction before the attack, then its
prediction will be incorrect also after the attack. Second,
we assume that if a tree uses a feature f for its prediction
over x then attacking f causes the tree to generate a wrong
prediction.
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Note that these assumptions are very conservative. An in-
correct tree may, by chance, provide a good prediction after
the attack. More importantly, modifying a feature f does
not necessarily flips the test performed on every node using
that feature and leads to a wrong prediction. These assump-
tions allow to clear formulation of the problem, and our
experiments show that the error introduced is interestingly
small.
Under the above assumptions, the aim of the attacker Ab is
to find a set of b features that are used by the largest number
of distinct trees. Let’s denote with Sf the set of trees in
T using feature f , and let S be S = ⋃f∈F Sf . Then the
most successful attack is given by the subset S′ ⊆ S with
|S′| ≤ b such that | ∪Si∈S′ | is maximized. The thoughtful
reader has surely recognized that this formulation of our
problem is nothing else that an instance of the maximum
coverage problem.
Note that algorithm FPF limits the use of a single feature
to at most r trees (the number of rounds) out of a total of
r(2b+ 1) trees, to some extent, making it more difficult for
the attacker to find a cover.
Before attacking the maximum coverage problem we make
a few improvements to provide a more accurate definition
of sets Sf .
First, we do not consider trees in T with an incorrect pre-
diction before the attack.
Second, we note that a tree may include a feature f in some
of its nodes, but these nodes may never be traversed during
the evaluation of an instance x. Therefore we say that a tree
t belongs to Sf for an instance x only if the traversal path
of x in t includes a node with a test on feature f .
Last, among the nodes along the traversal path of instance x
before the attack, we distinguish between nodes where the
test xf ≤ v is true, and nodes where the test is false. In the
former case, the attacker must increase the value of xf to
affect the traversal path, while in the latter case xf should
be decreased. Clearly, these two attacks cannot coexist.
Therefore, we define sets S+f and S
−
f , where we include a
tree t in S+f if feature f is in the traversal path of x with a
true outcome of the test xf ≤ v, and in S−f otherwise.
We thus achieved a more accurate modeling of when an
attack can actually affect the final prediction. This also
reduces size of sets S+f , S
−
f decreasing the risk of overesti-
mating the effect of an attack.
We can finally summarize the maximum coverage problem
as follows. Given the set S =
⋃
f∈F S
+
f ∪ S−f , the most
successful attack is given by the subset S′ ⊆ S with |S′| ≤ b
under the constraint that if S+f and S
−
f cannot be included
together in S′ that maximizes the cover of the (correct) trees
in the forest T .
We say that there is no possible attack if the number of trees
in the largest cover plus the number of trees providing a
wrong prediction before attack is the majority.
Note that however, this is a conservative estimate as the at-
tacker my modify all the features identified by the maximum
cover without being able to affect the final forest prediction.
In the following, we use this conservative set cover formula-
tion to define heuristic strategies that can be used to provide
a lower-bound to the accuracy of a forest on a given dataset,
or to speed-up the brute-force approach by discarding those
instances for which a sufficiently large cover does not exist.
4.3. Fast Accuracy Lower Bound
Given an attacker Ab, a forest T and an instance x, we
denote with ω the number of trees providing a wrong pre-
diction and with S the elements of the set cover formulation
as defined above.
It easy to provide an upper bound to the size of the largest
cover as follows. First sort the sets in S according to their
size. Then, we select the b largest sets by enforcing the con-
straint that S+f and S
−
f cannot be considered together. Let
SFLB be the covering sets selected as above, we know
that the size of the largest cover cannot be larger than
SFLB =
∑
Si∈SFLB |Si|. Therefore, we can pessimisti-
cally estimate the number of incorrect trees under attack as
ω + SFLB , which leads to an incorrect prediction over x if
larger than |T |/2.
By applying the same algorithm to every correctly classified
instance x ∈ D, we denote with EFLB the set of instances
for which ω + SFLB ≥ |T |/2, obtaining a lower bound on
the accuracy of the forest T on dataset D:
FLB(Ab,D) = |D| − |E ∪ EFLB ||D| .
4.4. Exhaustive Accuracy Lower Bound
In order to improve over the fast lower bound, we also
consider a more expensive option where all the possible
covers are considered and the maximal is eventually found.
Given an attacker Ab, let S the elements of the set cover
formulation as previously introduced. The exhaustive search
consists in enumerating all the possible subset S′ ⊆ S
of size at most b, and then for each of them we compute
the corresponding cover |⋃Si∈S′ Si|. Let SELB be the
maximum of such covers, we can define EELB the set of
instances inD for which ω+SELB ≥ |T |/2, and introduce
following accuracy lower bound:
ELB(Ab,D) = |D| − |E ∪ EFLB ||D| .
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Table 1. Datasets description.
DATASET |F| #top F maj. class |D|
WINE 13 7 73.0% 178
BREAST CANCER 30 15 62.7% 569
SPAM BASE 57 26 60.6% 4600
MNIST 0/1 784 54 53.3% 14780
MNIST 5/6 784 173 52.1% 13189
MNIST 1/7 784 79 51.9% 15170
4.5. Reducing the cost of the brute-force evaluation
Above we discussed some strategies to check whether there
exists a cover that identifies an harmful attack. Strategies
have different costs: FLB requires to sort the candidate
sets of the cover, while ELB performs an exhaustive search.
Both are however much cheaper than brute-force evaluation.
When the lower-bound information is not considered suf-
ficient, we propose to exploit the above strategies in the
following way. Given an instance x and an attacker Ab, we
proceed as follows:
1. first compute SFLB: if the cover is not sufficiently
large, then the instance cannot be attacked; otherwise
2. compute SELB: if the cover is not sufficiently large,
then the instance cannot be attacked; otherwise
3. use the brute-force method to check the existence of a
successful attack.
Experimental results show that the above cascading strategy
is able to strongly reduce the number of instances in a given
dataset D for which the brute-force approach is required.
5. Experiments
5.1. Experimental settings
In Table 1 we report the main characteristics of the datasets
used in the experimental evaluation, including the number
of features, the number of top relevant features measured as
those contributing to the 90% of the feature importance in a
Random Forest, and the relative size of the majority class.
Datasets, ranging from small to mid-sized, are associated to
a binary classification task, and they are commonly used in
adversarial learning literature.2
We compared our proposed algorithm FPF against the fol-
lowing tree-ensemble competitors:
• Random Forest (RF) (Breiman, 2001), which is known
to have some good level of robustness thanks to the
2All dataset are available at the UCI Machine Learning Reposi-
tory.
Table 2. Accuracy on the BREAST CANCER dataset.
model parameters attacker
b r |T | A0 A1 A2
RF 100 0.96 0.91 0.80
RSM 100 0.96 0.92 0.87
FPF
1 33 99 0.97 0.91 0.67
2 20 100 0.96 0.94 0.87
3 14 98 0.95 0.94 0.90
4 11 99 0.95 0.93 0.90
5 9 99 0.95 0.93 0.90
ensembling of several decision trees. As in the original
algorithm, each tree is trained on a bootstrap sample
of the dataset, with no constraints on the number of
leaves, and with feature sampling of size
√|F| at each
node.
• Random Subspace method (RSM) (Ho, 1998) which
was successfully exploited by Biggio et al., 2010. In
this case, each tree is trained on a projection of the
original dataset on a subset of its features. Validation
experiments showed best results with 20% feature sam-
pling.
Hyper-parameter tuning on a validation set showed that both
FPF and RSM perform best when limiting the number of
leaves to 8. Similarly, we limited the number of trees to
100 for datasets BREAST CANCER and SPAM BASE, and
to 300 for dataset WINE. We observed that WINE requires
a larger forest due to its limited number of features. All
results were computed on a randomly selected test set sized
1/3 of the original dataset. Hereinafter, we use b to address
the training parameter of FPF, and we use k for the attack
strength of attacker Ak.
The following experimental evaluation aims at answering
the following research questions:
• is FPF able to train more robust model?
• how is FPF affected by the number of rounds r and
the expected attacker power b?
• how accurate are the proposed bound, and can we ex-
ploit them to efficiently analise models on larger at-
tacker budgets k?
5.2. Robustness Analysis
In Tables 2,3,4 we report the accuracy of FPF, RF and
RSM against an attacker that can modify 0, 1 or 2 features.
Indeed, we report the case of no attacks for a more complete
evaluation, but in an adversarial scenario the attacker has no
reason for not conducting an attack. For FPF we evaluate
its robustness on varying the number of rounds r and the
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Table 3. Accuracy on the SPAM BASE dataset.
model parameters attacker
b r |T | A0 A1 A2
RF 100 0.96 0.58 0.18
RSM 100 0.90 0.82 0.70
FPF
1 33 99 0.93 0.81 0.34
2 20 100 0.91 0.83 0.72
3 14 98 0.90 0.83 0.75
4 11 99 0.88 0.83 0.77
5 9 99 0.86 0.83 0.77
Table 4. Accuracy on the WINE dataset.
model parameters attacker
b r |T | A0 A1 A2
RF 300 0.98 0.87 0.15
RSM 300 0.97 0.92 0.71
FPF
1 100 300 0.98 0.89 0.51
2 60 300 0.98 0.92 0.71
3 42 294 0.97 0.92 0.74
4 33 297 0.97 0.92 0.75
5 27 297 0.95 0.92 0.79
defense strength b, still keeping the total number of trees
about constant and comparable with the size of the forests
generated by competitor algorithms.
In all datasets, RF performs best or second best in absence
of attacks, but its accuracy drops significantly under attack.
The perturbation of one single feature is sufficient to harm
the model, with a loss of about 40 points in accuracy on
SPAM BASE, and when attacking two features the accuracy
drops under 20% for SPAM BASE and WINE datasets. As
previously discussed, the L0-norm attack we are tackling
in this work is indeed very powerful and sufficient to fool a
very accurate and effective random forest model.
The RSM model provides good performance in absence
of attacks, meaning that the dataset projection is not disad-
vantageous, and it is much more robust than RF in present
of attacks. However, when attacking two features, RSM
exhibits a drop of 10 to 20 points in accuracy.
The proposed FPF algorithm can provide the best robust-
ness in all attack scenarios. When increasing the defensive
b, the accuracy slightly decreases in absence of attacks, but
always increases under attack, suggesting that large b can
be useful even with weaker attacks. The performance of
FPF is similar to that of RSM when only one feature is
attacked, but when two features are attacked FPF shows sig-
nificantly better performance than RSM with a 10% relative
improvement on both SPAM BASE and WINE datasets.
We conclude that FPF is able to outperform state-of-the-art
competitors especially with a stronger attacker.
Table 5. Accuracy of FPF on the BREAST CANCER dataset when
varying the number of rounds r.
b Ak
NUMBER OF ROUNDS r
1 15 30
1
0 0.964 0.969 0.974
1 0.881 0.902 0.902
2 0.108 0.670 0.691
2
0 0.954 0.964 0.964
1 0.902 0.943 0.943
2 0.804 0.866 0.871
3
0 0.954 0.954 0.954
1 0.923 0.938 0.938
2 0.851 0.897 0.902
4
0 0.943 0.954 0.954
1 0.907 0.928 0.933
2 0.871 0.887 0.902
5
0 0.933 0.954 0.948
1 0.912 0.923 0.928
2 0.876 0.892 0.897
5.3. Sensitivity analysis
In Table 5 we evaluate the sensitivity of FPF w.r.t. the num-
ber of rounds r on the BREAST CANCER dataset. Similar
results were observed for the other datasets. As expected,
the ensembling strategy improves the accuracy of the re-
sulting model, and accuracy increases when increasing the
number of rounds until a plateau is reached. We can con-
clude that using a large number of rounds r improves the
robustness of the trained model.
The impact of b is evaluated in Table 6. In this case a
trade-off is apparent. Even if increasing b is expected to
increase robustness against stronger attacks, at the same
time it reduces the number of features that can be exploited
when training a single tree. This harms the performance
of the whole ensemble especially with larger values of b or
when the dataset contains a limited number of informative
features. The results in Table 6 show that when using a
limited number of trees, accuracy increases with b. But
when the forest is sufficiently large to exploit the ensembling
benefits, then the limited accuracy of singles trees plays an
important role making not rewarding the use of larger values
of b. For instance, this is the case of the BREAST CANCER
dataset, where we identified only 15 informative features
which are difficult to partition in 2b+ 1 sets for b=5.
We conclude that, while it is beneficial to increase the num-
ber of rounds r, it is not always a good strategy to increase b,
unless the dataset we have at hand has a sufficiently large set
of informative features compared to the attacker strength.
5.4. Lower Bound Analysis
In table 7 we report the accuracy under attack computed
with BRUTE FORCE, ELB and FLB with respect to A1 and
A2. With attacks on 1 feature ELB and FLB have the same
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Figure 1. Accuracy lower bounds for large b.
Table 6. Accuracy of FPF on the BREAST CANCER dataset when
varying the partitioning parameter b.
|T | Ak PARAMETER b1 2 3 4 5
50
0 0.969 0.969 0.964 0.954 0.948
1 0.902 0.938 0.938 0.943 0.928
2 0.628 0.871 0.876 0.892 0.892
75
0 0.969 0.964 0.959 0.959 0.943
1 0.907 0.943 0.943 0.933 0.928
2 0.629 0.866 0.902 0.902 0.897
100
0 0.974 0.964 0.954 0.954 0.948
1 0.912 0.943 0.938 0.933 0.928
2 0.675 0.871 0.902 0.897 0.897
estimate of the accuracy under attack. With attacks on 2
features ELB performs better with small b. In general, both
models predict an accuracy very close to the real calculated
one. This means that, the proposed lower bounds can certify
the non attackability of a large portion of instances without
the cost of the brute-force exploration.
In Figure 1 we show the accuracy lower bound computed
on different dataset and on varying b and the attacker A.
The computational efficiency of the proposed bound allows
to compute the minimum accuracy for large values of b
and large attacker budgets. The figure shows how larger
values of b allow to sustain a larger attacker strength. Of
course, when the attacker becomes too strong compared
with the number of relevant features in the dataset, then the
accuracy of FPF drops. We include in our analysis three
Table 7. Lower bound analysis BREAST CANCER. FPF with
|T | ≈ 100
A1 A2
b BF ELB FLB BF ELB FLB
1 0.912 0.897 0.897 0.670 0.000 0.000
2 0.943 0.938 0.938 0.870 0.835 0.820
3 0.938 0.938 0.938 0.900 0.881 0.876
4 0.933 0.933 0.933 0.900 0.887 0.887
5 0.928 0.928 0.928 0.900 0.892 0.892
dataset generated from MINST by isolating instances of two
digits. The lower bounds allows us to state that a reasonable
accuracy can be achieved also when attacking more than
20 features. The weakest dataset is that of digits 5 vs. 6,
where clearly the attacker requires to change fewer pixels to
generate a misclassification.
6. Conclusion
This paper proposes FPF, a new algorithm to generate
forests of decision trees, based on random equi-partitioning
of the feature set, along with a projections of the dataset
on these partitions before training each single decision tree.
The method is proven to be resilient against evasion attacks,
and, more importantly, we are able to certificate in a very
efficient way that, given a test dataset, some of the instances
cannot be attacked at all, thus avoiding the costly computa-
tion of all the possible evasion attacks.
The experimental evaluation, carried out on publicly avail-
able datasets, is promising and ouperforms the main direct
competitor, based on ensembles build on random sampling
of the features. Moreover, we also show that our certified
lower bounds on the accuracy under attack are a very close
approximation of the actual accuracy.
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